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relationship, his failure to resort to legal process to protect his title is
sufficient to indicate his acquiescence in the adverse possession. The
fact that he gives the tenant a lease when unaware of any other tenancy
relationship, rather than resort to legal process, should not operate to
deprive him of his legal title. To allow this result would seem to give
an unfair supremacy to the relationship of landlord and tenant to the
detriment of the holder of the legal title and would seem to be contrary
to the purpose and reason for statutes allowing the acquisition of title to
property by adverse possession.
NAOMI E. MORRIS
Constitutional Law-Due Process-Admissibility of Confessions
The decision in the "Reader's Digest Murder Case,"' recently handed
down by the United States Supreme Court, presents quite a dilemma
to state courts in their determination of the admissibility of confessions.
In a line of decisions beginning at least as early as 1936,2 the Supreme
Court has set aside as violative of the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment convictions in which "third degree" methods were
used to extract confessions from the accused.3
The common law principle of exclusion of involuntary confessions
rested on the theory that they were untrustworthy testimony; that the
accused may have given an untrue confession to avoid or end present
pain and coercion. 4 A new test of what constitutes an involuntary con-
fession has evolved in the last decade and, until the decision in the
principal case, appeared to be becoming an established principle of con-
stitutional law. While this test is not enunciated in any case as a uniform
' Stein v. New York, 73 Sup. Ct. 1077 (1953). The case rose to the Supreme
Court on writ of certiorari after the Court of Appeals of New York affirmed con-
viction. 303 N. Y. 856, 104 N. E. 2d 917 (1952).
'Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U. S. 278 (1936). Involuntary confessions were
excluded by federal courts on the ground that they were in violation of the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination as far back as the leading case of
Brai v. United States, 168 U. S. 532 (1897). Judicial thinking tended then to
consider involuntary confessions only in the light of the self-incrimination clause
of the Fifth Amendment which, of course, was inapplicable to the states. But as
Chief Justice Hughes said in Brown v. Mississippi: "Compulsion by torture to ex-
tort a confession is a different matter. The state is free to regulate the procedure
of its courts in accordance with its own conceptions of policy, unless in so doing it
offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our
people as to be ranked as fundamental.. . . The freedom of the state in establishing
its policy is the freedom of constitutional government and is limited by the require-
ment of due process of law." 297 U. S. 278, 285 (1936).
'Chambers v. Florida, 309 U. S. 227 (1940) ; White v. Texas, 310 U. S. 530(1940) ; Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U. S. 143 (1944) ; Malinski v. New York, 324
U. S. 401 (1945) ; Haley v. Ohio, 332 U. S. 596 (1948) ; Watts v. Indiana, 338
U. S. 49 (1949) ; Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338 U. S. 62 (1949) ; Harris v. South
Carolina, 338 U. S. 68 (1949) ; Johnson v. Pennsylvania, 340 U. S. 881 (1951) (per
curiam).
'3 WiGcoR, EVIDENCE § 822 (3d ed. 1940).
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standard, formulated as is a "prescription in pharmacopoeia," 5 the prin-
ciple relied upon is that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment proscribes the use against an accused of a confession which
was extorted from him by inflicting physical6 or mental pain, regardless
of the reliability of the confession.8 But as pointed out in a note in this
Law Review,9 the test rests upon but a handful of opinions, and in all
of the cases having full opinions there were strong dissents. Four of
the cases were five-four decisions,'0 while two others were six-three
decisions." The permanence of the test became uncertain when, in the
summer of 1949, death took two justices who had consistently sided with
the majority, Justices Murphy and Rutledge. While three other cases 12
have considered the problem of involuntry confessions and the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment since the Watts, Turner,
and Harris decisions were handed down in June of 1949, it was not until
Stein v. New York that the tenuous constitutional rule was questioned
by the majority of the court.
In the principal case, petitioners Stein, Cooper, and Wissner were
convicted and sentenced to death for the felony murder' 3 of the com-
panion of the driver of a Reader's Digest delivery truck, which petitioners
robbed. Police had arrested petitioners after two months of investigation
and had carried them separately and at different times to police barracks,
where they were illegally held incommunicado and interrogated for
periods of two to four days. Stein and Cooper made confessions, which
they contended were extorted from them by force, but Wissner remained
' Malinski v. New York, 324 U. S. 401, 417 (1945) (concurring opinion of
Frankfurter, J.).
' Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U. S. 278 (1936).
"Watts v. Indiana, 338 U. S. 49 (1949).
O Lisenba v. California, 314 U. S. 219 (1941).
'Note, 28 N. C. L. RZv. 393 (1950).
10 Harris v. South Carolina, 338 U. S. 68 (1949) ; Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338
U. S. 62 (1949) ; Haley v. Ohio, 322 U. S. 596 (1948) ; Malinski v. New York, 324
U. S. 401 (1945).
"
1Watts v. Indiana, 338 U. S. 49 (1949) ; Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U. S. 143(1944).
1 Stroble v. California, 343 U. S. 181 (1952) (conviction affirmed; record
showed no evidence of coercion; in fact, it appeared that defendant was anxious to
confess, although he claimed he was slapped once by arresting officer) ; Gallegos v.
Nebraska, 342 U. S. 55 (1951) (conviction affirmed; no evidence to show coercion,
although the confessions were obtained during a period of 25 days of illegal deten-
tion by federal and state officers before accused was brought before a magistrate and
before counsel was appointed. While McNabb v. United States, 318 U. S. 332
[1942] proscribes the use in federal courts of evidence obtained by federal officers
during illegal detention, the McNabb rule is not a limitation imposed by the Due
Process Clause on the state courts. Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U. S. 596 [1944]) ;
Johnson v. Pennsylvania, 340 U. S. 881 (1951) (per curiam; reversed on the basis
of Turner v. Pennsylvania).
" A homicide committed by a person engaged in the commission of a felony.
It is first-degree murder and carries a mandatory death sentence unless the jury
recommends life imprisonment. N. Y. PENAL LAw §§ 1044(2), 1045, 1045-a (Mc-
Kinney, 1944).
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silent. After this period of custody, they were examined by the prison
doctor who later testified that the petitioners had various bruises and
abrasions about the body. 14 The examining physician also testified that
the injuries "could have been" sustained prior to arrest.'5
When the confessions were offered in evidence at the trial, the de-
fendants objected to their introduction on the grounds that they had been
obtained through coercion. The trial court heard evidence in the pres-
ence of the jury as to the issue of coercion and left determination of the
issue to the jury. While this New York practice'0 of letting the con-
fession go to the jury to -determine its voluntariness is contrary to the
general rule that admissibility of a confession is a question of law for
the court,' 7 the Fourteenth Amendment does not forbid jury trial of the
issue.' 8 Petitioners did not take the stand,'0 and the issue of coercion
rested on charges of their counsel and the circumstantial evidence of
multiple bruises and injuries on petitioners' bodies the day after arraign-
ment. The jury was instructed to consider the confessions only if it
found them to have been voluntarily made. A general verdict of guilty
was rendered by the jury.
As the Supreme Court points out, "under these circumstances, we
cannot be sure whether the jury found the defendants guilty by accepting
and relying, at least in part, upon the confessions or whether it rejected
the confessions and found them guilty on other evidence."'20  The court
therefore held that the jury could properly have found the confessions
not to have been obtained by physical force or threats or psychological
14 "Testimony by the prison doctor who examined them predicated mainly on the
notes he made at the time was that Wissner had a broken rib and various bruises
and abrasions on the side, legs, stomach and buttocks; Cooper had bruises on the
chest, stomach, right arm, and both buttocks; Stein had a bruise on his right arm."
Stein v. New York, 73 Sup. Ct. 1077, 1083 (1953).
" Id. at 1085, note 11. The doctor testified that it was difficult to state exactly
how long the bruises had been there; that the bruises on Cooper's body could
have been there as long as six days (he had been in custody three days) ; and that
Stein's bruises could have been sustained prior to arrest. Ibid.
1' The trial judge must exclude the confession if he is convinced that it was not
freely made, or that the verdict that it was freely made would be against the weight
of evidence, but if the issue of voluntariness presents a fair question of fact, he
must receive the confession and leave to the jury, under proper instructions, the
ultimate determination of its voluntary character and truthfulness. N. Y. CODE
CRIM. PROc § 395 (McKinney, 1945).
1' 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 861 (3d ed. 1940). This rule is well recognized by
the majority of jurisdictions, including the federal courts and 30 states, all of
which are surveyed by Dean Wigmore. North Carolina is in accord with the
majority rule. State v. Manning, 221 N. C. 70, 18 S. E. 2d 821 (1942).
" Lisenba v. California, 314 U. S. 219 (1941).
9 Under New York law, if defendants had taken the witness stand to support
the charges that the police had obtained the confession by coercion, they could have
been subjected to general cross-examination. See People v. Trybus, 219 N. Y. 18,
113 N. E. 538 (1916). As the court points out, if they had testified, undoubtedly
their previous criminal records would have been put in evidence, and by refusing
to testify those records were not brought to the attention of the jury.
"0 Stein v. New York, 73 Sup. Ct. 1077, 1085 (1953).
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coercion, and that if the jury so resolved that the confessions were ad-
missible, it would not have been constitutional error.21 If the jury had
rejected the confession as involuntary, however, the court held that the
jury could constitutionally have based a conviction upon other sufficient
evidence. The court thus resolved its own dilemma by finding that it
was neither error if the jury admitted and relied on the confession, nor
was it error if they rejected it and convicted on other evidence.2 2
To this holding, Justices Black, Frankfurter, and Douglas filed vigor-
ous dissents. justice Black declared, "beginning at least as early as
Chambers v. Florida [1940], this court has set aside state convictions
as violative of due process when based on confessions extracted by state
police while suspects were held incommunicado. That line of cases is
greatly weakened if not repudiated by today's sanction of the arbitrary
seizure and secret questioning of the defendants here. State police wish-
ing to seize and hold people incommunicado are now given a green
light. '23 Justice Frankfurter in his dissent said "the court goes beyond
a mere evaluation of the facts of this record. It makes a needlessly
broad ruling of law which overturns what I had assumed was a settled
principle of constitutional law." 24  He adds that "it is painful to be
compelled to say that the court is taking a retrogressive step in the
administration of criminal justice. I can only hope that it is a tempo-
rary, perhaps an ad hoc, deviation from a long course of decisions."
25
Justice Douglas echoes the alarm of the other dissenters and cites a body
of opinion26 against the decision of the majority.27  While the court had
2 The court was impressed by the evidence that Stein and Cooper confessed after
"only" 12 hours of intermittent questioning stretched over a 32-hour period, and
that Cooper spent much of that time "driving a bargain" with police and parole
officers that if he confessed, his brother would not be prosecuted for parole viola-
tion. Id. at 1093.
" The court also held that even if the confessions of Stein and Cooper were
considered to have been involuntary, their use would not have violated any federal
right of Wissner, who did not confess but was implicated by those who did. As
for Wissner's contention that his rights were infringed because he was unable to
cross-examine accusing witnesses (the confessors, who did not take the stand), the
court held that there is no right of confrontation under the Fourteenth Amendment,
citing as authority West v. Louisiana, 194 U. S. 258 (1904), in which it was decided
that the Federal Constitution did not preclude Louisiana from using affidavits on a
criminal trial. As Justice Black points out in his dissent however, a later case,
It re Oliver, 333 U. S. 257 (1948), reversed a conviction, inter alia, because the
defendant was denied reasonable notice of the charge against him and the right to
confront witnesses against him. Stein v. New York, 73 Sup. Ct. 1077, 1099 (1953).
.2 Stein v. New York, 73 Sup. Ct. 1077, 1099 (1953).
21 Id. at 1100.
-
2Ibid.
26 Stroble v. California, 343 U. S. 181 (1952) ; Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U. S.
55 (1951) ; Haley v. Ohio, 332 U. S. 596 (1948) ; Malinski v. New York, 324 U. S.
401 (1945) ; Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U. S. 596 (1944).
2' Douglas also contends in his dissent that in all of the cases in which the court
has dealt with the practice of discrimination against Negroes in the selection of
juries as violative of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, from Neal v.
Delaware, 103 U. S. 370 (1880) down to Avery v. Georgia, 73 Sup. Ct. 891 (1953),
the determinative question was whether a constitutional right had been violated,
1953]
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characterized these rulings as dicta, Douglas points out that Malinski v.
New York was a square holding that if the admitted confession were
found to be coerced a subsequent conviction would be set aside, even
though the evidence apart from the confession might have been sufficient
to sustain the jury's verdict,28 and that the conviction in Malinski was
reversed, even though other evidence might have supported the verdict.2D
The holding in the Malinski case followed language in other cases 0
similar to that used by Justice Roberts in Lisenba v. California: "The
aim of the requirement of due process is not to exclude presumptively
false evidence, but to prevent fundamental unfairness in the use of evi-
dence whether true or false."3'
The ruling in Stein v. New York that the jury could reject the con-
fessions as involuntary and still base a conviction on other sufficient
evidence, appears then to be a retreat from the precedent of the Supreme
Court itself. It is interesting to note that Justices Douglas, Frankfurter,
and Black, now dissenters, were with the majority in the Ashcraft,
Malinski, Haley, Watts, Harris, and Turner decisions; while Justice
Jackson, who here writes the majority opinion, was dissenting along
with Justices Reed and Burton and Chief Justice Vinson in those cases.
The new Justices, Clark and Minton, take the majority view in the
instant case. As Douglas states, "from the undisputed facts it seems
clear that these confessions would be condemned if the constitutional
school of thought when Haley v. Ohio,3 2 Watts v. Indiana,83 Turner v.
and not if there were other sufficient evidence to convict. In the Avery case, the
court said if the jury commissioners failed in their duty to use a non-discriminatory
method of selecting a jury, the conviction must be reversed, "no matter how strong
the evidence of guilt." Stein v. New York, 73 Sup. Ct. 1077, 1103 (1953) (dis-
senting opinion of Douglas, J.).
2' "If all the attendant circumstances indicate that the confession was coerced
or compelled, it may not be used to convict a defendant. And if it is introduced at
the trial, the judgment of conviction will be set aside even though the evidence
apart from the confession might have been sufficient to sustain the jury's verdict."
Malinski v. New York, 324 U. S. 401, 404 (1945).
29 The court recognizes that it cannot characterize the Malinski case as dictum,
and expressly says that "except for the Malinski case the question raised here
could not have been raised or decided." Stein v. New York, 73 Sup. Ct. 1077, 1095
(1953). Without overruling or distinguishing the Malinski decision, the court
states that against the factual background of its other decisions which it had called
dicta, "we do not think our cases establish that to submit a confession to a state
jury for judgment of the coercion issue automatically disqualifies it from finding a
conviction on other sufficient evidence, if it rejects the confession." Id. at 1095.
" "If the confession which petitioner made in the District Attorney's office was
in fact involuntary, the conviction cannot stand, even though the evidence apart
from the confession might have been sufficient to sustain the jury's verdict." Stroble
v. California, 343 U. S. 181, 190 (1952). "The use of any confession obtained in
violation of due process requires the reversal of a conviction even though unchal-
lenged evidence, adequate to convict remains." Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U. S.
55, 63 (1951). "A coerced confession is inadmissible under the Due Process Clause
even though statements in it may independently be established as true." Watts v.
Indiana, 338 U. S. 49, 50, note 2 (1949).
"314 U. S. 219, 236 (1941). 332 U. S. 596 (1948).
"338 U. S. 49 (1949).
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Pennsylvania,3 4 and Harris v. South Carolina&5 were -decided still was
the dominant one."3 6  Those cases indicated that the Supreme Court
had directed a "mandate" to the state courts3 7 that confessions be ad-
mitted only when free from any physical or psychological coercion.
This was hailed by many as a salutary development in constitutional
law and criminal procedure,38 and a trend in the direction of the English
law, which is particularly sensitive to police abuses of the rights of the
accused.39  Certainly, it demonstrated that much had been accomplished
since 1931, when the Wickersham Commission reported that the extor-
tion of confessions by the police by mental or physical pressure was wide-
spread in this country,40 but that such methods still exist is shown by
the cases which continue to appear. A survey of the methods that have
been used to extort confessions tends to indicate that it has gradually
taken a reduced showing of coercion to result in a finding by the Su-
preme Court of a violation of due process.
41
"338 U. S. 62 (1949).
"338 U. S. 68 (1949).
Stein v. New York, 73 Sup. Ct. 1077, 1104 (1953).
' "It is sufficient to here say that we have reached the conclusion that the instant
confession was obtained under circumstances such as to constitute its use in evidence
a denial of due process, under the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United
States. Having so concluded, it is our duty to follow what we understand to be the
mandate of that court. Prince v. Texas, 155 Tex. Cr. R. 108, 111, 231 S. W. 2d
419, 421 (1950).
'
8 Note, 28 N. C. L. REv. 390 (1950).
" "Questioning of persons in custody; xlvii: a rigid instruction should be issued
to the police that no questioning of a prisoner, or a person in custody, about any
crime with which he is, or may be charged, should be permitted. (1) If a prisoner
expresses a wish to make a voluntary statement, he should be cautioned, offered
writing materials and left to write without being overlooked, questioned or
prompted." Only obvious ambiguities in prisoner's statements may be cleared up
by questions, which prisoner shall be free to answer or refuse to answer without
any coaxing or pressure by the police. Royal Commission on Police Powers and
Procedure, Cmd. no. 3297, at 144, as quoted in 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 847 (3rd
ed. 1940).
" Reported in National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, Re-
port No. 11, Lawlessness in Law Enforcement 153 (1931).
"Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U. S. 278 (1936) (confession obtained after ac-
cused was taken by a deputy and a mob to the woods, severely beaten and a noose
placed around his neck; conviction reversed) ; Chambers v. Florida, 309 U. S. 277
(1940) (defendants jailed in atmosphere of mob violence, subjected to five days
and nights of interrogation before they "broke" and confessed; conviction re-
versed) ; Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U. S. 143 (1944) (accused subjected to 36
hours of continuous questioning, during which time he was denied food and sleep;
conviction reversed); Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U. S. 596 (1944) (accused was
subjected to 16 days of intermittent questioning and had a pan of human bones
placed before him in order to obtain a confession; conviction affirmed, as a later
confession was determined voluntary) ; Malinski v. New York, 324 U. S. 401 (1945)
(defendant was arrested, stripped, and held incommunicado in order to coerce a
confession; conviction reversed) ; Haley v. Ohio, 332 U. S. 596 (1948) (a fifteen-
year-old Negro boy was interrogated from midnight until 5 a.m. and not permitted
to see friends or counsel and a confession was obtained; conviction reversed);
Watts v. Indiana, 338 U. S. 49 (1949) (accused was interrogated intermittently for
six days, during which time he was not given adequate opportunities for sleep or
a decent allowance of food; conviction reversed); Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338
U. S. 62 (1949) (accused was interrogated by relays of officers from four to six
1953]
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But throughout these decisions there have been strong dissents, a
major theme being that the Supreme Court was interfering with the
states in their administration of criminal justice.42 The alarm that
Jackson once expressed in his dissents over this "encroaching federal
power" over state courts is now embodied in the majority opinion of
the principal case. 43 The court feels that the state courts may be abdi-
cating their primary responsibilty of determining the admissibility of
confessions under their own rules, and that the conscience of the local
administration of justice may become subordinated to a federal Supreme
Court exercizing its conscience over the details of state police pro-
cedure.44
Thus the court, rather than deciding whether the confessions by
petitioners in the instant case were voluntary, holds that the jury could
have 'determined the issue either way and their verdict would be given
hours a day for five days; conviction reversed); Harris v. South Carolina, 338
U. S. 68 (1949) (defendant was questioned intermittently for three days; convic-
tion reversed).
" The typical dissent was that expressed by Justice Jackson in Ashcraft v. Ten-
nessee, 322 U. S. 143, 174 (1944) : "The use of the Due Process Clause to disable
the states in protection of society from crime is quite as dangerous and delicate a
use of federal judicial power as to use it to disable them from social or economic
experimentation."
The majority view of this line of cases is well stated by Justice Frankfurter in
Watts v. Indiana, 338 U. S. 49, 50, 53-55 (1949) : "Although the Constitution puts
protection against crime predominantly in the keeping of the states, the Fourteenth
Amendment severely restricted the states in their administration of criminal jus-
tice.... On review here of state convictions, all those matters which are usually
termed issues of fact are for conclusive determination by the state courts and are
not open for reconsideration by this court.... But issue of fact is a coat of many
colors. It does not cover a conclusion drawn from uncontroverted happening,
when that conclusion incorporated standards of conduct or criteria for judgment
which in themselves are decisive of constitutional rights. . . . If force has been
applied [to secure a confession], this court does not leave to local determination
whether or not the confession was voluntary. There is torture of mind as well as
body; the will is as much affected by fear as force. . . . A confession by which
life becomes forfeit must be the expression of free choice .... If it is the product
of sustained pressure by the police it does not issue from a free choice .... Even-
tual yielding to questioning under such circumstances is plainly the product of the
suction process of interrogation and therefore the reverse of voluntary .... Under
our system society carries the burden of proving its charge against the accused not
out of his own mouth. . . . In holding that the Due Process Clause bars police
procedure which violates the basic notions of our accusatorial mode of prosecuting
crime and vitiates a confession based on the fruits of such procedure, we apply the
Due Process Clause to its historic function of assuring appropriate procedure before
liberty is curtailed or life is taken. We are deeply mindful of the anguishing prob-
lems which the incidence of crime presents to the states. But the history of crimi-
nal law proves overwhelmingly that brutal methods of law enforcement are essen-
tially self-defeating, whatever may be their effect in a particular case."
"3 "Petitioner's argument here is essentially that the conclusion of the New York
judges and jurors are mistaken and that by reweighing the same evidence, we, as
a superjury, should find the confessions were coerced. This misapprehends our
function and scope of review, a misconception which must be shared by some state
courts with the result that they feel a diminished sense of responsibility for pro-
tecting defendants in confession cases." Stein v. New York, 73 Sup. Ct. 1077, 1090
(1953).
"Note, 28 N. C. L. Ray. 390 (1950).
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"decisive respect. ' 45  But the court does not expressly overrule its pre-
vious holdings, for it further declares:
Of course, this court cannot allow itself to be completely bound
by state court determination of any issue essential to decision of a
claim of federal right, else federal law could be frustrated by dis-
torted fact finding. It is only miscarriages of such gravity and
magnitude that they cannot be expected to happen in an enlight-
ened system of justice, or be tolerated by it if they do, that cause
us to intervene to review in the name of the Federal Constitution,
the weight of conflicting evidence to support a decision by a state
court.
46
This language has more of a familiar ring; it is found in previous
cases which declare that the securing of a confession through the "denial
of due process is the failure to observe that fundamental fairness essen-
tial to the principles of liberty and justice, '47 and that the absence of
such fairness "fatally infected the trial. '48  Perhaps this indicates that
the court is not abandoning but just contracting the radius of the pro-
tection of due process to cover only those instances in which extreme
abuses by the police are employed to obtain confessions, or where the
Supreme Court thinks there is insufficient evidence to convict without
the use of the confession. Despite the concern of the dissent,49 there are
no indications that the decision is a return to the old trustworthiness test,
long since buried by newer constitutional principles. 50 How retrogres-
sive a step this case represents will be shown only by future decisions of
the court. But until a more definitive opinion is handed down, state
courts will face the problem of whether they can permit a conviction on
the basis of other sufficient evidence when the question of the voluntari-
ness of the confession goes to the jury.5
" Stein v. New York, 73 Sup. Ct. 1077, 1090 (1953).
"'Id. at 1091.
47 Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U. S. 278 (1936).
"Lisenba v. California, 314 U. S. 219 (1941).
"Stein v. New York, 73 Sup. Ct. 1077, 1104 (1953) (dissenting opinion of
Douglas, J.).
" Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U. S. 278 (1936).
" The language used by the court indicates that it will reverse in the future only
when extreme abuses are found in the securing of the confession or when there
is not other sufficient evidence to convict, regardless of whether the confession is
determined voluntary by the jury or the judge. The court states, "of course, where
the judge makes a final determination that a confession is admissible and sends it to
the jury as a part of the evidence to be considered on the issue of guilt and the
ruling admitting the confession is found on review to be erroneous, the conviction,
at least normally, should fall with the confession." Stein v. New York, 73 Sup. Ct.
1077, 1096 (1953). Despite this statement, the whole tenor of the decision is that
it will take a showing of extreme coercion before the Supreme Court will reverse a
state court finding of guilt, irrespective of who determines the voluntariness of the
confession. Not only are those jurisdictions in which the question is one of fact
for the jury facing a dilemma in resolving the problem of admissibility of confes-
19531
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Due process as secured by the Fourteenth Amendment is very flex-
ible, and can be enlarged or contracted according to the policy of the
Supreme Court at a given time. Confessions cannot always be tested to
fit a Procrustean bed, but must be measured in the light of a flexible due
process requirement that state courts observe that fundamental fairness
essential to the protection of the accused by refusing to use a confession
obtained by physical or psychological coercion. It is to be hoped that
we are not entering upon "a new regime of constitutional law, '5 2 in
which the rights of the accused are valued less highly than is the efficient
functioning of the machinery for the administration of justice, but rather
that a resilient Due Process Clause will reassert in succeeding cases the
principles that nearly a generation of decisions has evolved.
JAmEs ALBERT HousE, JR.
Constitutional Law-Racial Restrictive Covenants-Recovery of
Damages for Breach
Since 1948 when the Supreme Court held that racial restrictive
covenants could not be specifically enforced by injunction in state or
federal courts,1 legal writers have speculated2 and the courts have dis-
agreed3 on the recovery of damages. Now the Supreme Court in Bar-
rows v. Jackso 4 has settled the issue by holding the award of damages
by a state court for the breach of racial restrictive covenants to be state
sions under the Due Process Clause, but also facing the same problem are thosejurisdictions in which the voluntariness of the confession is a question of law for
the court. The latter must decide whether a conviction now must be reversed when
the trial judge admits a confession which may have been involuntary, but there is,
however, other sufficient evidence on which the jury could have found the accused
guilty. And just how much coercion the Supreme Court is now likely to say is of
"such gravity and magnitude" to require a reversal is an unknown measure and a
problem facing all jurisdictions.
" Stein v. New York, 73 Sup. Ct. 1077, 1102 (1953) (dissenting opinion of
Douglas, J.).
' Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1 (1948) (state courts) ; Hurd v. Hodge, 334
U. S. 24 (1948) (federal courts) (discussed in Notes, 27 N. C. L. REV. 224 (1949),
28 N. C. L. REv. 442 [1950]).
"Barnett, Race Restrictive Covenants Restricted, 28 OR. L. REV. 1 (1948)
Crooks, The Racial Covenant Cases, 37 GFo. L. J. 514 (1949) ; Groves, Judicial
Interpretation of the Holdings of the United States Supreme Court in the Restric-
tive Covenant Cases, 45 ILL. L. REV. 614 (1950); Heard, Race and Residence:
The Current Status of Racial Restrictive Covenants, 1 BAYLOR L. Rav. 20 (1948) ;
Howell, Recent Developments in the Law of Racial Restrictions on Real Property,
1 INTRA L. REv. OF ST. Louis 222 (1951) ; Kiang, Judicial Enforcement of Re-
strictive Covenants in the United States, 24 WAsH. L. REV. 1 (1949) ; Lowe, Racial
Restrictive Covenants, 1 ALA. L. REv. 15 (1948) ; Ming, Racial Restrictions and
the Fourteenth Amendment: the Restrictive Covenant Cases, 16 U. OF CHi. L. Ray.
203 (1949) ; Scanlan, Race Restrictions in Real Estate-Property Values v. Hunan
Values, 24 NoTRE DAIE LAW. 157 (1948).
See notes 10 and 11 infra.
'73 Sup. Ct. 1031, 97 L. Ed. (Adv. p. 961) (1953).
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